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Abstract 
It is argued here that the many public goods associated with education are derivatives of an 
ultimate good.  This ultimate good is the overall purpose of life in general and is similar to a 
telos as understood in ancient Greek culture.  This paper reviews the notions of ‘good' and 
telos, and examines implications of Bauman’s analysis of our present individualizing era, the 
role of personal meaning making and the nature of education.  It is then argued that pre-
service teachers can do the ultimate public good in a postmodern society, by articulating a 
developed personal, professional perspective that expresses a purpose (telos) of life. 
 
This is not an idle esoteric project.  Dewey (1958, p. 383) reported that “the greater part of 
life” will remain in darkness unless illuminated “by thoughtful inquiry”.  It is argued in this 
paper that such an illumination into the greater part of life can be made possible by the 
articulation of a telos.  This perspective provides the basis for all other goods which teachers 
decide to do.  This project accords well with a recent UNESCO report which calls for such a 
perspective, and its importance is clearly indicated in its claim that “It is no exaggeration on 
the Commission’s part to say that the survival of humanity depends thereon” (Delors, 1998, p. 
18). 
 
The ultimate public good 
Aristotle indicated that ‘good’ could be considered as belonging to three categories.  These 
were the external, the body and the soul, and with reference to the latter he claimed that 
“those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially good” (trans. Chase, 1911, p. 
13, my emphasis).  This soul is described by Aristotle as having both irrational and rational 
attributes.  The irrational includes the appetites and desires, and the rational consists of 
intellectual and moral attributes.  His notion of good then, involves our desires being 
tempered with intellectual and moral reasoning. 
 
Aristotle’s virtues were expressions of good character, which enabled people to live a life of 
excellence (aretê) and happiness (eudaimonia).  Aristotle developed his notion of special 
goodness that pertained to this soul, and conceptualised it as a Chief Good.  This represented 
“that which all things aim at” (trans. Chase, 1911, p. 1, my emphasis).  This Chief Good, 
being the main thing aimed at, the end purpose or telos for humankind, was understood from 
the perspective of the community rather than that of the individual. 
 
What was ‘good’ for Aristotle is often contrasted with other notions of good, such as found in 
the Christian New Testament.  In contradistinction to Aristotle’s virtues which included 
wealth, strength and courage, Christian theology promotes notions of weakness, poverty and 
humility.  Nietzsche made great issue with this difference.  He argued that the conception of 
‘good’ was subject to the worldviews of various interest groups.  Nietzsche was against any 
notion of a grand teleology existing for humankind and through Zarathustra claimed, “A 
thousand goals have there been so far... the one goal is lacking.  Humanity still has no goal” 
(Nietzsche, 1954, p. 60).  Zarathustra observed that only humankind could create a meaning 
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for things - a human meaning.  Therefore, he encouraged the individual to create a meaning in 
which he or she would become responsible.  He declared, “He, however, has discovered 
himself who says, ‘This is my good and evil’; and ‘this is my way; where is yours?’” 
(Nietzsche, 1954, pp. 194 - 195). 
 
Nietzsche goaded his readers to consider going beyond good and evil – which is a title he 
used for one of his books.  He challenged his readers to consider how they understood the 
criteria that would determine whether something was to be considered either good or bad.  
Nietzsche (1989, p. 55) called this a “dangerous formula” because it allowed the individual to 
create her or his own values regardless of what the commonly accepted ones were.  In short, 
one could apply one’s own meanings to the terms good and evil. 
 
Nietzsche’s works were aimed to address the apparent nihilism of his age, a time of 
meaninglessness, which is understood to be postmodern in the sense that no one worldview, 
with its systematised values, can be legitimized.  Nietzsche claimed that there are no such 
things as absolute values that can be appealed to once ‘Truth’ (in the absolute sense) is 
understood to be no longer attainable.  Consequently Nietzsche argued that, in order to 
recognise meanings in a potentially nihilistic context, the individual must re-evaluate all 
values.  One must become a creator of one’s own notion of the good and the values by which 
one is then to be held accountable.  One must determine for oneself what is of value, what is 
good and what is true. 
 
Nietzsche’s views concerning the central importance of personal meaning making and choice 
when it comes to the notion of ‘the good’, is reflective of many postmodern writers.  Lyotard 
is recognised as famously announcing the end to modernism’s metanarratives, which makes 
the postmodern world fractured, ambivalent and uncertain.  In this era, Bauman (2001, p. 69) 
identifies the individualizing effect these conditions have and argues that “ambivalence may 
be, as before, a social phenomenon, but each one of us faces it alone, as a personal problem”.  
Bauman, like Nietzsche, throws his readers back on themselves as individuals, and 
encourages them to become active and critical meaning makers and participants rather than 
passive and docile consuming citizens. 
 
The making of meaning however, is a derivative of purpose.  Morris (1992, p. 57) states that 
“if my life is to have meaning (or a meaning), it thus must derive its meaning from some sort 
of purposive, intentional activity.  It must be endowed with meaning”.  Any meaning, 
including the establishing of a meaning of a (public) good, must, as Nietzsche argued, be part 
of one’s personal worldview as to what makes life worth living.  For Aristotle, it was his 
notion of the telos which indicated the purpose by which excellence and happiness could be 
dialectically contextualised. 
 
Aristotle’s Chief Good was derived from a perspective of a telos - what was good for the 
public or society.  This not only involved the intellectual development of individuals, but also 
the community required them to be moral.  Morality itself, as argued by Ellin (1995) is more 
suited to enriching society as a whole rather than enriching individuals, and is therefore 
considered to be specifically a social good.  While moral goodness is understood to be a 
public good, whatever particular meaning is attributed to ‘good’ for a specific community, 
must, as was mentioned before, be derived from a particular purpose or telos.  The telos for 
the public is understood to be that which is considered to be the point aimed at, or end 
purpose of the community, which enables it to live well. 
 
The ultimate public telos 
As mentioned earlier, the Greek term telos denotes the point aimed at or purpose.  This term 
forms the root for the word teleology, meaning the overall quality of being purposeful.  In 
ethical theory teleology is often contrasted with deontology.  The former generally refers to 
producing good, while the latter generally refers to following moral duties or principles.  
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Taylor (1989, p. 3) delineates between the modernistic deontological rule-following approach 
which focuses upon “what is right to do” with the more postmodern condition “on what it is 
good to be”.  Therefore, the moral issue is not one of which rules to follow but rather ‘what 
sort of person is one to become?’.  That is, what is the purpose by which one can assign 
meaning to one’s existence.  The meaning of a public good then should be derived from such 
a teleological position.   
 
There can be many meanings of ‘good’ which can be derived from various teleological views 
concerning the public to which we as educators belong.  However, it is argued here that the 
notion of an ultimate good would refer to that which gives life purpose and makes life 
meaningful.  In this context the response to the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ is 
considered to involve the ultimate telos.  This proposal of the ultimate public good can be 
criticised as being a particularly Western view, where since Ancient Greece, there has been 
the premise that there is a telos - a point to life.  Yalom (1980, p. 470) contrasts this with the 
Eastern view, where “Existence has no goal.  It is pure journey”.  Nevertheless, it is argued 
here that in order to address the topic of ‘public good’, meanings should be derived from 
some telos. 
 
To examine this issue of life’s meaning more closely, it is helpful to differentiate between the 
questions ‘what is the purpose of life?’ and ‘what is the purpose of my life?’.  Yalom refers to 
the former as the ‘cosmological’, noting that it can be addressed by a worldview as found in 
various religions.  The latter he terms ‘terrestrial’ and includes a purpose, a reference to an 
intention, aim or function, and as more personal and even secular.  MacIntyre (1984, p. 28) 
contends that this latter question, which focuses on individual choice and responsibility, is the 
more appropriate one to emphasise in these postmodern times, and argues that “it is by way of 
their intentions that individuals express bodies of moral belief in their actions.  For all 
intentions presuppose more or less complex, more or less coherent, more or less explicit 
bodies of belief, sometimes moral belief”.  So while both questions have great value, it is the 
terrestrial question that is considered to have particular significance in providing the basis by 
which the meaning of an ultimate public good might be derived. 
 
By emphasising this terrestrial question which asks ‘what is the purpose of my life?’ morality 
must become a necessary component of this exercise.  This is because an individual is argued 
to be a social being having a presence-in-the-world.  Morality in postmodernity is understood 
to have greater significance if considered teleologically rather than deontologically.  This is 
not confined of course to postmodernism as Aristotle’s ethics were also teleological.  His 
virtues were not a means to a meaningful life, but rather were expressions of the Chief Good.  
MacIntyre (1984, p. 118) addresses the teleological project which asks ‘what sort of person 
must I become?’ and answers it by how “in practice” one lives one’s life.  Mehl (2001, p. 4) 
argues that “this existential issue of personal becoming” to which MacIntyre refers, is tackled 
by Kierkegaard’s philosophy. 
 
Kierkegaard’s writings call the individual back out of the crowd to live an authentic existence.  
By living authentically, one can choose one’s own identity and possibilities rather than have 
these dictated by the crowd or by some framework encouraging rule-following behaviour.  
Kierkegaard (1987, vol.2, p. 259) stated that when becoming authentic, “the individual has 
known himself and has chosen himself”.  For Kierkegaard, this was where one’s purpose and 
meaning of life was to be found.  Being authentic allows one to determine how things are to 
count towards one’s situation and how one is to act in relation to them.  This is similar to 
Nietzsche’s encouragement for individuals to become responsible by re-evaluating and 
choosing goods and values, and not as has occasionally been the interpretation, to become 
immoral.  Nietzsche calls individuals to become responsible for establishing an authentic 
relationship to what is good, by being able to distinguish between good and evil. 
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This ability to choose between goods and to determine the criteria by which goods might be 
recognised, refers to a higher layer of decision making which lies beyond many goods 
themselves.  This higher layer is described by Taylor (1989) as consisting of hypergoods, 
which are the higher-order goods by which lesser goods can be determined.  He argues that 
these contribute to our sense of being good rather than just informing us of doing good.  He 
claims that “We sense in the very experience of being moved by some higher good that we 
are moved by what is good in it rather than what it is valuable because of our reaction.  We 
are moved by it seeing its point as something infinitely valuable” (Taylor, 1989, p. 74).  This 
level of hypergoods, or what Taylor refers to as strong evaluation, enables persons to make 
meanings as to what are then to count as lesser goods. 
 
 
Personal meaning making 
Persons can be considered as beings who experience meaning where ‘meaning’ is understood 
to unify rationality and reason with other aspects of experience such as feeling, conscience 
and imagination (Phenix, 1964, p. 5, 21).  For Heidegger, ‘meaning’ refers to the relations of 
entities to a structural whole of meanings and intentions (Palmer, 1969, p. 133) and 
constitutes part of his concepts of self-understanding, care and significance.  This ‘subjective 
meaning’ is an understanding of self-in-the-world and therefore has a degree of ‘objectivity’ 
associated with it as the ‘world’ is not of the individual but of the public (Pring, 2000, p. 100).  
Betanzos argues that Wilhelm “Dilthey has a strong sense for existential concerns” too where 
an individual is considered by Dilthey to have an “overwhelming need to put together a 
pattern of meaning for his life as a whole emerges a Weltanschauung, or ‘worldview’” 
(Betanzos, 1988, p. 29).  According to Dilthey this is how life can be made sense of or 
comprehended as a whole, where “meaning is the special relationship which the parts have to 
the whole in a life” (Dilthey, 1976, p. 235-6).   
 
Meanings are generally socially constructed with others, and so an understanding of others is 
an important contribution in being able to appreciate critically the various facets of cultural 
meanings.  Personal beliefs regarding one’s self and the world contribute to a personal 
worldview that consists of a morally responsible approach to others.  Therefore, in addition to 
encouraging students to be creative and critical towards generally accepted cultural 
knowledge (Fritzman, 1990), education should also foster sensitivity to differences.  The 
individual is not an indifferent detached ‘atom’ from the rest of humanity, but is in-the-world 
with others and can therefore be referred to by the more inclusive concept of “the individual-
subject-and-others” (Smeyers, 1995, p. 407).   Education should therefore place an emphasis 
upon understanding and accepting the ‘Other’, which fosters “a tolerance of uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and change, and a humility with respect to one’s own identity and beliefs” 
(Bagnall, 1995, p. 92).   
 
Drawing upon the notion of ‘meaning’ as conceptualised by Dilthey, Heidegger and Phenix, it 
is argued here that persons can be understood as “meaning-making creatures” (Hill, 1992, p. 
9).  This meaning-making characteristic can take the form of a personal narrative, where one 
is able to make sense of one’s place in the whole scheme of things (Erricker et al., 1997).  
Such a claim accords well with the views of Dewey, who maintained that education must be 
meaningful for individuals personally, in order for them to engage with the curriculum.  
Education is not just to be understood as the subject matter or even the activities, but also as 
meaningfulness that is considered to be valuable, worthwhile and significant for the 
individual learners.   
 
Such meaning making needs to involve the deepest aspects of our being in order to address an 
ultimate public good.  While information can be gained via an engagement with various 
sources, this does not make it personally significant.  As Bruner (1990, p. 4) reminds us 
information, being a term which lends itself to a computer-processing metaphor “comprises 
an already pre-coded message within a system”.  Meaning however, is something which an 
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individual encodes upon experiences.  Such a difference is reflective of what James and 
Dewey refer to as second-hand thinking (information) and first-hand thinking (making 
personal sense and meaning from experiences).  It is this latter aspect which is pertinent for 
constructing meanings which give personal significance in an overall purpose for a public 
good.   
 
 
Education and the ultimate good 
The relation between education and the good life is an ancient one and yet it appears not to be 
obvious with a superficial glance which may view education simply as a means to developing 
cultural capital.  There is usually an assumed innate goodness associated with the enterprise 
of education.  That is, through education individuals and the public at large are understood to 
receive some benefit.  Both the individual and society are made ‘better’ through this 
enterprise.  Having a similar correspondence to Aristotle’s notion of good character, there is 
the current ideal of an educated person.  Similarly to Aristotle’s position, this ideal of the 
educated person is understood to be good from the perspective of the public, even from a 
liberal perspective because it has moral character as a central component to its view. 
 
The term ‘education’ is derived from the Latin edūcēre meaning ‘out’ and dūcēre meaning ‘to 
lead’.  Hence this notion has traditionally implied that education is the process of nourishing 
or rearing a person, to ‘lead out’ of his or her potential for development.  It could be implied 
that the learner is coming out of his or her ‘natural’ state of ignorance and impulse based upon 
appetite and caprice.  However the learner is also part of the social world and therefore 
education can be seen as offering an initiation in to public understandings, purposes and 
practices.   
 
‘Education’ does not necessarily aim to achieve anything beyond itself, being understood as 
providing the values and criteria by which manners of proceeding (rather than specific 
content) should comply (Atkinson, 1965, p. 180; Peters, 1965, p. 92).  The notion that 
education should be necessarily contributing to something extrinsic to itself is objected to 
(Peters, 1967, p. 5), because education stands for something that in itself is intrinsically 
worthwhile, the search for extrinsic ends is like seeking the purpose of morality or the good 
life (Peters, 1964, p. 17; 1970, p. 29).  If the discipline of education is taught in a scientific 
approach, somewhat akin to the psychometrics discourse often frequently found in programs 
teaching pedagogy, it is likely, as Dewey (1958, p. 383) argued, that “by far the greater part 
of life goes on in a darkness unilluminated by thoughtful inquiry”. 
 
Dewey argued that all persons act and behave according to their beliefs, and it is therefore the 
task of education to enable persons to believe intelligently.  The intellectual thoroughness that 
Dewey recommended in order to enable persons to believe intelligently, was basically 
philosophical.  In his writings which promoted social morality, he described this thoroughness 
variously but often as value judgements and critical reflection.  He always stressed that such 
thinking was not to be separated by too great a distance from direct experience, and argued 
that 
For these forms of moral theory while releasing morals from the obligation of telling 
man what goods are, leaving that office to life itself, have failed to note that the office 
of moral philosophy is criticism; and that the performance of this office by discovery 
of existential conditions and consequences involves a qualitative transformation, a re-
making in subsequent action which experimentally tests the conclusions of theory. 
(Dewey, 1958, p. 433) 
 
According to Dewey, a certain depth of critique appears necessary to uncover this relation.  
Such a discussion needs to be ‘serious’ in order to unconceal the relation that exists between a 
notion of the good life and the educational enterprise that is aimed towards its attainment.  
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In his book ‘Ethics and Education’, Peters outlines his Transcendental Argument in relation 
to his notion of a more specific concept of ‘education’.  This argument is grounded in the 
asking of his ‘serious question’ that asks ‘how ought I to live?’ or ‘what ought I to do?’.  His 
whole argument thus becomes tenuous, according to Blake et al., (2000, p. 46) if people fail 
to ask themselves this question.  However, Frankl (2000) argues that we should not wait for 
individuals to ask themselves such serious questions but rather we should be actively asking 
them of each other.  Such serious questions are not specific to the work of Peters because they 
reflect age-old concerns that have been central to education.  According to Lawton and 
Gordon (2002, p. 17), “defining how to live wisely in the world (and not how to live well off 
[in] it) has been the oldest educational question”. 
 
Although the criteria found in Peters’s Transcendental Argument can be used to determine 
whether an activity is ‘educational’ or not, for others the argument is not persuasive that the 
educational enterprise is in anyway opposed to achieving extrinsic and utilitarian goals.  Both 
Plato (trans. Lee, 1955, p. 144) and Aristotle (trans. Chase, 1911, p .1) argued that education 
can be a means for particular ends, which thereby contextualise education beyond itself.  
Bagnall (1990, p. 46) therefore argues that it is more appropriate that educational goals 
“should be justified by sound arguments for their place in and contribution to the furthering of 
the values and value frameworks of modern society” than by only appealing “to their self-
evident intrinsic good”.  
 
Appealing to the public good, consisting in ‘others’, involves recognising one’s presence-in-
the-world-with-others.  This existential characteristic is recognised by Noddings who 
represents this through her notion of care.  She argues that - 
Finally, we must consider Heidegger's deepest sense of care.  As human beings, we 
care what happens to us.  We wonder whether there is life after death, whether there 
is a deity who cares about us, whether we are loved by those we love, whether we 
belong anywhere; we wonder what we will become, who we are, how much control 
we have over our own fate.  For adolescents these are among the most pressing 
questions: Who am I?  What kind of person will I be?  Who will love me?  How do 
others see me?  Yet schools spend more time on the quadratic formula than on any of 
these existential questions. (Noddings, 1992, p. 20) 
 
Noddings’s view is based on Heidegger’s idea that persons are immersed in-the-world, and 
therefore have a disposition to caring about their place in it.  Care is also an aspect of 
citizenship, which is able to transcend both the private and the public spheres (Dam & 
Volman, 1998, p. 232), enabling a greater effectiveness in social interactions, which in turn 
lead to “better” selves (Schultz, 1998, p. 381).  This approach reflects Heidegger’s (1959, p. 
53) assertion that schools should have a spiritual atmosphere, not a scientific one.  It is an 
appeal that can be heard from many who claim that there is a need to focus more on the value 
of such things as the mind and spirit rather than material and economic gains (Young, 1992).   
  
The pressing questions listed above by Noddings are described as being existential and 
include the questions ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is my purpose?’.  Nye and Hay (1996, p. 151) 
report that these questions are raised by children when examining issues of personal identity.  
Education alludes to facilitating the development of a sense of self-identity and to 
encouraging meaning-making in the sense of what one’s place in-the-world means.  This 
aspect of education is argued here to be essential if individuals are to see significance in, and 
commit to, an ultimate public good, which, as was referred earlier to the report by Delors, is 
essential if global peace is to be attained by humanity. 
 
 
Promoting the telos through Teacher Education 
Bauman reports that postmodernity presents ambiguity and uncertainty as personal problems, 
and it is argued here that programs of teacher education should do likewise.  He proposes that 
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education should cultivate “the ability to live daily and at peace with uncertainty and 
ambivalence, with a variety of standpoints… tolerance of difference… fortifying critical and 
self-critical faculties… [and] assume responsibility for one’s choices..” (Bauman, 2001, p. 
138).  One project that is here argued as being able to facilitate with the development of these 
attributes, is the development of a personal, professional perspective. 
 
In order to serve the ultimate public good, teacher education programs should require students 
to develop a clear sense of a telos for education.  Personal perspectives of education which 
include such a telos enable teachers to critically give meanings to experiences and evaluate 
existing practices and also be able to create possibilities of their own as they endeavour to 
attain educational ideals for which they are passionately committed.  In order to derive such 
meanings, it is first necessary to identify, articulate and develop one’s telos for public life in 
general.  This suggestion is not considered to be radical, as it has been claimed by others that 
the meanings and purposes of education are inextricably linked to the meaning and purpose of 
life (Freire, 1972; Higginbotham, 1976; O’Hear, 1981; J White, 1990).   
 
While Dewey acknowledged that the notion of natural teleology was even out of fashion in 
his time, he did identify the importance of individual tendency.  As such, perceptual 
understandings were recognised as having an existential origin.  Therefore the development of 
a particular perspective of education, if it is to be significant, must include the presence of the 
personal.  When addressing aims or purposes of education in general, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that ‘education’, being an abstract concept, does not have purposes or aims of 
itself.  This is recognised by Dewey (1985, p. 114) who stated, “it is well to remind ourselves 
that education as such has no aims.  Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not 
an abstract idea like education”.  Purposes then, belong to persons and not to concepts.  This 
might appear to be a rather mute point to make, but it is argued to be a significant issue when 
pre-service teachers are ‘taught’ about education.  Rather than learning the purposes, goals or 
aims of education in a passive or docile sense, pre-service teachers should rather be 
encouraged to give meaning to the enterprise of education and what they understand to be the 
good life.  
 
It is argued that there is great value in having pre-service teachers articulate their perspective 
on ‘serious’ issues.  These articulations should be a culmination of regular journal entries 
which allow students to respond to the many and various theories, theorists, perspectives, 
experiences and research findings to which they encounter,  Such a perspective, in addition to 
clarifying understandings of these elements which make up the discourse of education, should 
engage with such existential questions as: 
Who are you? 
What is the purpose of your life? 
What is the purpose of life in general? 
What does it mean to be good? 
How ought you to live? 
How ought you to teach? 
What ought you to teach? 
 
Initially the responses to these are often assumed to be quite self-evident for students, but as 
Briztman (2003, p. 37) observes, these meanings become elusive when an articulated 
explanation is attempted.  Such an explanation is often made possible when a personal 
perspective is articulated through a narrative.  Taylor (1989, p. 92) claims that our lives are 
often grasped in narrative and argues that “we aren’t full beings in this perspective until we 
can say what moves us, what our lives are built around” but that “articulation can bring us 
closer to the good as a moral source, can give it power”.  Such is the potential for personal 
narrative that Bruner (1990, p. 56) even reports that whatever is not constructed within 
narrative is actually lost from memory. 
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Articulating a personal, professional perspective, not only elucidates a telos on which 
important meanings can be derived, but it also serves to clarify personal identity, that is, the 
unity of one’s being.  As MacIntyre argues,  
I have suggested so far that unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods 
of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life 
conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness 
will invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the context of certain 
virtues adequately.  These two considerations are reinforced by a third: that there is at 
least one virtue recognized but the tradition which cannot be specified at all except 
with reference to the wholeness of a human life – the virtue of integrity or constancy.  
‘Purity of heart,’ said Kierkegaard, ‘is to will one thing.’  This notion of singleness of 
purpose in a whole life can have no application unless that of a whole life does. 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 203) 
 
Student-teachers will in effect be able to articulate their personal identity through the unity 
that such a perspective would explain.  Being personal rather than an ‘objective’ report 
summarising the theories of others, objective ‘real’ goods will not be the issue, but rather 
what are deemed to be the goods (Bauman, 2001, p. 202).  This potentially may be accused of 
promoting a form of solipsism rather than any agreed public good, let alone ultimate public 
good.  However, if these personal, professional perspectives begin to be developed and 
articulated at the beginning of a degree program, then there are several years where these 
perspectives can be negotiated with the social ‘others’, both in the form of fellow students, as 
well as tertiary staff, authors of various readings and possibly mentoring teachers too.  The 
social environment which engages in such a forum is argued here to be opportunity to which 
Dewey refers as being necessary in order to illuminate the greater part of life itself. 
 
Conclusion 
If teachers are to do the public good then teacher education programs have an important role 
to play in helping to identify what might be considered as 'good'.  It has been argued that the 
criteria required to determine whether something is to be regarded as a public good must be 
derived from a telos.  This telos, by its nature, identifies the ultimate public good because it 
consists of the purpose of the life of the public itself.  This is something that can only be 
engaged with in a personally significant manner.  Therefore it has been suggested here that 
the development of a personal, professional perspective might be one avenue by which 
individuals can come to develop a notion of the ultimate public good.  This has great 
importance because it is from this perspective that student-teachers will base all their 
decisions.  By its social character, the telos developed (with its values) in such perspectives 
will transcend the subjectivity of the individual students.  Such a project accords well with the 
recent United Nations report which identifies that it is education’s task to enable “individuals 
to transcend themselves to consider universal ‘moral’ values”, and claims that such a task is 
considered so important “that the survival of humanity depends thereon” (Delors, 1998, p. 
18). 
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